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JUDICIAL CREATION OF THE PRIMA FACIE
TORT OF PLAGIARISM IN FURTHER-
ANCE OF AMERICAN PROTEC-
TION OF MORAL RIGHTS
Although the European doctrine of moral right acknowledges a creator's prima
facie right to be recognizedfor his work product, courts in this country have tradi-
tionally struggled within the confines of existing property, contract, tort, and copy-
right law to afford redress to an individual whose work has been appropriated by
another. In Bajpayee v. Rothermich, however, an Ohio appellate court articulated
an individual's right, distinctfrom common law remedies, to protect his intellectual
property. This Note examines, in the context of Bajpayee, the existence ofremedies
potentially available to a plaintifwho alleges improper use of his intellectual prop-
erty. It contrasts these remedies with the European doctrine ofmoral right and con-
cludes that by acknowledging a creator's right to be recognizedfor his work,
Bajpayee may be the first step toward American adoption ofthe moral right doc-
trine.
INTRODUCTION
OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM has never recognized a creator's
prima facie right to be recognized for his work. It has strug-
gled, in a rather inconsistent fashion, to redress injury resulting
from the appropriation of an individual's work product through
traditional channels of recovery-tort, property, contract, and
copyright law. In 1977, however, an Ohio court recognized the
right of an inventor to be acknowledged for his scientific discov-
ery. In doing so, it may have created a new cause of action in
American courts.
In Bajayee v. Rothermich,I the plaintiff was employed by the
Columbus Medical Center Foundation as a biochemist in charge
of the research laboratory. During the course of his employment,
the plaintiff made discoveries in the treatment of arthritis through
the use of radioactive indomethacin suppositories, which were the
subject of his unpublished article intended for future publication.'
The defendant, the president and medical director as well as a
member of the board of trustees of the foundation, without the
plaintiff's knowledge or consent, condensed and presented the dis-
covery as his own before the American Society of Clinical Phar-
macology and Therapeutics.3 The plaintiff conceded that he was
1. 53 Ohio App. 2d 117, 372 N.E.2d 817 (1977).
2. Id at I18, 372 N.E.2d at 818.
3. Id
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not entitled to common law copyright protection for the publica-
tion by virtue of the shop work doctrine, which assigned an irrevo-
cable license to use the work product to his employer, the
Columbus Medical Center Foundation.4 Rather, he sued the de-
fendant as a co-employee, alleging that the defendant's acts were
intentional and malicious; that the defendant had converted the
plaintiff's intangible property to his own use; and that the defend-
ant had intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's contract rights
with his employer, resulting in his discharge.5
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
This decision was reversed when the appellate court found that
sufficient material issues of fact existed regarding the plaintiff's re-
tention of the right to be recognized for his work.6 The court
stated that the plaintiff's cause of action was distinct from com-
mon law copyright and rested upon his right to be recognized for
his own creation and ideas.7 Although the court did not decide
whether the plagiarism constituted an independent cause of ac-
tion, an invasion of privacy, or a prima facie tort,' it concluded
that the plaintiff's right to be recognized for his work product ex-
isted and was actionable.9 Thus, the court reversed the finding of
summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with its decision. The parties subsequently disposed of the
action in an out-of-court settlement.' 0
4. Id For a discussion of the shop work doctrine, see notes 60-67 infra and accom-
panying text.
5. Id These allegations were based on three distinct causes of action: (I) violation
of the plaintiffs right of publicity so as to constitute a prima facie tort, (2) conversion of
intangible property rights, and (3) intentional interference with the plaintiffs contract
rights. Id For a discussion of the elements of the first action, see notes 146-63 infra and
accompanying text. The defendant's admission by affidavit of his omission of the plaintiff's
name from the abstract report of the discovery led the court to summarily conclude that the
defendant had attributed to himself authorship of the work. 53 Ohio App. 2d at 118, 372
N.E.2d at 818.
6. Id at 123-24, 372 N.E.2d at 821.
7. Id at 120, 372 N.E.2d at 819.
8. Id at 122, 372 N.E.2d at 820. The court stated that "lilt makes no difference
whether we label this claim for relief plagiarism, invasion of privacy, or prima facie tort,
which plaintiff contends the claim to be." Id at 122, 372 N.E.2d at 820. It proceeded to
define a prima facie tort as "the intentional infliction of injury upon another without excuse
or justification by an act which in and of itself may not be unlawful." Id For the elements
and an analysis of an action for invasion of privacy, see notes 133-45 infra and accompany-
ing text.
9. 53 Ohio App. 2d at 123, 372 N.E.2d at 821.




By labelling the case as one of first impression, " the Bapayee
court avoided any examination of existing causes of action to de-
termine their availability as methods of redress. This Note is in-
tended to accomplish that which the Bajayee court did not-to
examine the legal and equitable remedies potentially available to
those plaintiffs who have claimed improper or unauthorized use of
their intellectual property. Intellectual property traditionally in-
cluded artistic, literary, and musical creations, scientific discover-
ies, inventions, secret processes, and a creator's symbols or ideas.
It has been extended, however, to encompass character creations
such as comic personalities, a creator's style of mannerisms or
voice inflection, and original expressions. 2 This Note shows that
courts have permitted redress for injuries resulting from the piracy
of such property through copyright, property, contract, and tort
causes of action, although the scope of these remedies has proven
to be somewhat limited.
The Note first traces the development of state and federal
copyright law. Historically, the Copyright and Supremacy
Clauses of the Constitution were applicable only to published
works by virtue of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act). 13 Un-
published creations were excluded from the Act and instead were
subject to federal and state common law copyright actions.' 4
With the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act),' 5 how-
ever, the common law of copyright for unpublished works was
abolished for those works which were specifically covered by the
new statutory provisions.' 6 Although the 1976 Act was not in ef-
fect at the time that the cause of action in Bajayee arose, '7 this
Note analyzes the Act to determine the statute's applicability to
future actions in which plagiarism of unpublished works may be
I . 53 Ohio App. 2d at 122, 372 N.E.2d at 820.
12. See Note, Intellectual Propertr-Performer's Style-A Quest for Ascertainment,
Recognition, and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J. 561 (1975). One court defined an intellectual
production as an "intangible, incorporeal right [which] exists separate and apart from the
property in the paper on which it is written, or the physical substance in which it is embod-
ied." Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 464, 466, 114 P.2d 370, 372
(1941). In that case, although the misappropriation of a motion picture scenario was
grounds for a tort cause of action for plagiarism, it was barred by the statute of limitations.
13. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded 1978). See notes 33-37 infra and accompany-
ing text.
14. See notes 39-50 infra and accompanying text.
15. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. app.).
16. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
17. See note 56 infra.
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alleged.' 8 Further, in view of Bajpayee's concession of common
law copyright ownership of his discovery to his employer, a dis-
cussion of the shop work doctrine, both in its traditional setting' 9
and as it has survived under the 1909 and 1976 Acts is included.2 °
The Note then focuses on the scope of the common law protec-
tion of intellectual property. The development of trade secret pro-
tection is traced, as well as the protection afforded unpublished
works.2' The first amendment privilege allowing appropriation of
intellectual property is also analyzed.22 The Note next examines
different actions available at common law in order to ascertain
their applicability to Bajpayee. In light of the employment rela-
tionship between the parties in Bapayee, actions for unfair com-
petition,23 misappropriation,24  and breach of contract 25 are
precluded for the plaintiff. Likewise, actions for invasion of pri-
vacyz 6 or publicity27 are improper due to the absence of commer-
cial exploitation. Actions for breach of trust,28 breach of an
implied contract,2 9 and implied defamation,3" although hampered
by severe limitations, are suggested as possible grounds for recov-
ery.
The Note also examines the European doctrine of "moral
right.' ' 3' This doctrine affords foreign claimants a safeguard
against infringements of their rights of personality, which are re-
garded under Continental systems as inherent, inalienable, and
distinct from rights protected under copyright law. Although hesi-
tant to adopt the moral right doctrine per se, our courts have
achieved substantially the same result. Since Bapayee is one such
example, it is re-examined in the context of the moral right doc-
trine.32 Though Bajayee did not expressly adopt the moral right
doctrine, the plaintiffs interests that the court sought to protect
18. See notes 51-59 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 60-62 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 68-81 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 82-84 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 91-97 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 98-105 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 129-132 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 133-45 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 146-63 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 129-32 infra and accompanying text.
29. See text accompanying note 132.
30. See notes 106-128 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 164-86 infra and accompanying text.
32. See note 182 infra and accompanying text.
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fell squarely within its ambit.33 Thus, the Note concludes that, by
the court's recognition of plagiarism as a prima facie tort,
Bajayee may be the first step toward American adoption of the
Continental moral right doctrine.
I. INTERESTS PROTECTED UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Federal Statutory and State Common Law Copyright
Protection
The first copyright statute to be enacted in the United States
was the Copyright Act of 1790.1' It defined the protectible inter-
ests of American citizens following publication, while the com-
mon law protection for unpublished works was left to judicial
interpretation. Courts, however, refused to give common law pro-
tection to published works. For example, in Wheaton V. Peters,
35
the defendant during his employment as the official court reporter,
published a number of Supreme Court cases. He was challenged
by his predecessor for violating his common law and statutory
rights of copyright, despite the latter's failure to comply with all of
the Copyright Act provisions. The Court acknowledged the exist-
ence of common law rights, 36 but held them inapplicable to works
which were published, due to the protection for such works af-
33. See notes 164-86 infra and accompanying text.
34. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (superseded 1831). The first Anglo-American copyright
legislation was the Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710). For a fascinat-
ing account of the genesis of the law of copyright, beginning in ancient Egypt, see
Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property" Part !- From the Begin-
ning to theAge of Printing, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1975).
The English courts recognized the natural law of common law copyright, embodying
the Continental doctrine of moral right, for unpublished works and for rights and privi-
leges existing independently of copyright. In contrast to protected American rights, this
natural right was inherent in each creator, inalienable, indestructible, and remained unal-
tered by the Statute of Anne. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Prop-
erty: Part 11- From the Age of Printing to the Future, 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 45, 68 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Streibich, Part I]].
In 1783, the Continental Congress of the United States passed a resolution recom-
mending "the several States to secure to the Authors or Publishers of New Books the Copy-
right of such Books." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1783-1862, at 1 (1962), citedin Streibich, Part!!1 supra, at 68 n.165. Accord-
ingly, all of the states except Delaware adopted copyright statutes, which proved inade-
quate due to their limitations and lack of interstate effect. Id at 69. To remedy these
defects, the Constitution authorized Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and Use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
35. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 223 (1834).
36. Id at 228.
1979]
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forded by the statute.37
At the time of the cause of action in Bajpayee, the Copyright
Act of 1909 was in effect. Under this statute, failure by the pub-
lished author to comply with the statutory requirements rendered
the work unprotected and within the public domain. Compliance
offered protection for over twenty-eight years of an exclusive mo-
nopoly for commercial exploitation, renewable for an equivalent
duration, after which the work entered the public domain.38 The
Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the states to protect unpub-
lished works, not otherwise copyrightable, at "common law or in
equity."'3 9
Hence, the states undertook to protect unpublished works witi
common law copyright actions when the work satisfied three con-
ditions: (1) the expression of the work must have been developed
beyond the point of abstraction; (2) the work must have been orig-
inal; and (3) it must have been unpublished.4" A substantial
amount of case law developed in both the federal and state courts
regarding protection of unpublished works. Indeed, in an action
before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1946 4 alleging
common law copyright infringement, the court reviewed more
than 200 federal court decisions.4 2 The court accepted those deci-
sions without even entertaining the possibility of a conffict and
federal preemption under the Copyright Act of 1909, illustrating
the states' autonomous reign over the protection of unpublished
works.
In 1964, two Supreme Court cases invalidated state statutory
interference with the objects of federal copyright legislation. In
both Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 43 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,' the Court disallowed state statutory
protection against unfair competition for works which were ex-
cluded from federal patent or copyright laws. The Court reasoned
37. Id. at 231-32.
38. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded 1978). See C. GREGORY
& H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1185 (1st ed. 1959).
39. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (superseded 1978).
40. Comment, Copyrights: States Allowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under
Federal Law, 58 MINN. L. REV. 316, 318 n.Il (1973). See I M. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.02, at 2-16, 2-17 n.l 1 (15th ed. 1978). For a review of state common law protection
against the appropriation of intangible and intellectual property, see notes 85-163 infra and
accompanying text.
41. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1946).
42. Id at 898.
43. 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
44. 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
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that the federal laws by implication permitted free access to and
use of material left in the public domain.45 These decisions were
subsequently interpreted to permit redress for commercial ex-
ploitation of another's property interest only when that interest
fell outside the scope of the copyright clause.46
This presumption of state interference with the objects of fed-
eral copyright legislation was later rejected by the Court in Gold-
stein v. California,4 7 when the Court upheld a California penal
statute prohibiting record piracy. The Court expanded the poten-
tial protection of unpublished works by stating that the Copyright
Clause neither impliedly nor expressly grants exclusive power to
the federal government to protect works, and that the Copyright
Act of 190948 did not preempt state protection over all works
which might be considered "writings" within the statute.49 Hence,
state statutory and common law protection was once again avail-
able to redress invasions to intellectual property. The Supreme
Court further held that the twenty-eight year limitation permissi-
ble under the Copyright Act was inapplicable to the states, thus
impliedly sanctioning unlimited duration for such state protec-
tion.50
B. The 1976 Ac-Its Impact on Common Law Protection
The 1976 Act5 ' abolishes the common law of copyright for un-
published works that are specifically covered by the new statutory
provisions.52 The House Judiciary Committee Report indicates
45. 376 U.S. at 231-32; 376 U.S. at 237. In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
the Court stated that "when an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interefere with the
federal policy. . . of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copy-
right laws leave in the public domain." Id
46. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1967).
47. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
48. Ch. 320, §§ 4, 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (superseded 1978). Section 4 provides that
"[t]he works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all writings
of an author." Section 5 lists specific categories of protected works, followed by a state-
ment that "[t]he above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copy-
right as defined in section 4 of this title . See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at
568-69.
49. 412 U.S. at 560. Accord, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
50. 412 U.S. at 560. See generally Comment, supra note 40, at 323.
51. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. app.).
52. 17 U.S.C. app. § 301(a) (1976). The scope of rights embodied in the 1976 Act is
specified in § 106. That section provides:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has exclusive rights to do and to author-
ize any of the following:
19791
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that state remedies which are not preempted by the 1976 Act in-
clude causes of action for "breaches of contract, breaches of trust,
trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and decep-
tive trade practices such as passing off and false representation."53
State statutes and common law actions for misappropriation of
commercial property interests are also preserved if they are "not
equivalent to any such exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright . . ."'I The House Report states that "consistent with
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
Id § 106.
53. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976). Although the final version of
the new Act deleted the aforementioned enumeration of exempted state actions, the House
debates indicate the nature of continued permissible state actions which do not conflict
with the New Act.
The House Judiciary Committee Report is enlightening regarding the legislative intent
to preserve various state actions which provide redress for injuries to personal rights:
The examples in clause (3), while not exhaustive, are intended to illustrate
rights and remedies that are different in nature from the rights comprised in a
copyright and that may continue to be protected under State common law or
statute. The evolving common law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade
secrets, and the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected
as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copy-
right infringement. Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to
contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract; however, to the ex-
tent that the unfair competition concept known as "interference with contract re-
lations" is merely the equivalent of copyright protection, it would be preempted.
The last example listed in clause (3)--"deceptive trade practices such as pass-
ing off and false representation"-represents an effort to distinguish between
those causes of action known as "unfair competition" that the copyright statute is
not intended to preempt and those that it is. Section 301 is not intended to pre-
empt common law protection in cases involving activities such as false labeling,
fraudulent representation, and passing off even where the subject matter involved
comes within the scope of copyright statute.
Id at 132, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5748. "Passing off"
may require some clarification. It is one genre of the tort of unfair competition, also known
as false representation, whereby the tortfeasor claims another's goods or services as his
own. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
54. 17 U.S.C. app. § 301(b)(3) (1976). The House Report elaborates on the misappro-
priation doctrine:
"Misappropriation" is not necessarily synonymous with copyright infringe-
ment, and thus a cause of action labeled as "misappropriation" is not preempted
if it is in fact based neither on a right within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 nor on a right equivalent thereto. For example, state law
[Vol. 29:735
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the 1964 Supreme Court decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif-
fel Co., . . . and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., . . .
preemption does not extend to causes of action, or subject matter
outside the scope of the revised Federal copyright statute.""
Although the cause of action in Bajayee is not subject to the
application of the 1976 Act, since the cause of action arose prior to
its effective date,56 the right in one's work product must be evalu-
ated in the context of the 1976 Act to determine its future availa-
bility. The interests alleged by the plaintiff in Bajpayee are similar
or identical to some of those interests that the House Judiciary
Committee Report exempts from federal preemption.5 7  More-
over, the scope of the 1976 Act does not extend to a "discovery. 58
Thus, it appears that the cause of action newly recognized in
Bajpayee would not fall within the protection of the 1976 Act5 9
should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional principles of eq-
uity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor
of the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting "hot" news, whether in
the traditional mold of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918), or in the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or
financial data bases.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5109, 5748 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 131, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5747 (citations
omitted). For a thorough analysis of the 1976 Act, see Goldstein, Preempted State Doc-
trines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1977).
56. Actions brought before January 1, 1978 are expressly exempted from the 1976 Act.
17 U.S.C. app. § 301(b)(2) (1976).
57. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
58. Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976).
59. Works of authorship under the 1976 Act's protection include but are not limited
to: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomines and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
and (7) sound recordings." Id. § 102(a). Further, the 1976 Act covers compilations and
derivative works:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compi-
lations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing pre-existing
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preex-
isting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in
the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does
not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copy-
right protection in the preexisting material.
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and would thereby avoid preemption.
C. Ownershio of Literary Works Created During the Course of
Employment - The Shop Work Doctrine
The plaintiff in Bajpayee conceded that the shop work doctrine
precluded any common law copyright interest he may otherwise
have enjoyed in his scientific discovery.6" A consideration of the
development of the doctrine supports this conclusion. Prior to the
1909 Act, an employer possessed the common law right to copy-
right the products, creations, and inventions of his salaried em-
ployees, and to assign those rights by contract.61 Thus, property
interests in works produced during the course of employment by
an employee were presumed to vest in the employer, although this
presumption was rebuttable by proof of a contrary agreement be-
tween the, parties.62
The 1909 Act authorized either the author or proprietor of a
work to secure a copyright.63 The employer of a creator or author
was defined by the 1909 Act as within the scope of the term "pro-
prietor," and as such was eligible to secure a copyright over any
works made for hire.64
Judicial decisions since the Copyright Act of 1909 have con-
sistently upheld the right of an employer to secure copyrights over
works made during the course of employment, and have con-
strued the employer classification to include both natural persons
and corporations.65 Thus, at the time that the cause of action
Id. § 103.
60. 53 Ohio App. 2d at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 818.
61. E.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). In Bleistein,
the appellant's employees produced advertising sketches for the appellee's circus, which the
appellant copyrighted prior to transferring them to the appellee. The appellant's right to
the copyright in those works was upheld after the contractual period with the appellee had
expired. Id. at 250.
62. 1 M. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[D], at 5-28 (15th ed. 1978).
63. Ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (superseded 1978). A proprietor could also be
the publisher of a composite of works. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPY-
RIGHT LAW 85 (1961).
64. Ch. 320, § 26, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (superseded 1978). One commentator has char-
acterized this as being "[a]n example of man-made law barring enforcement of a natural or
moral right .... " He encourages the American adoption of the moral right doctrine.
Streibich, PartI, supra note 34, at 68 & n.167. See notes 164-86 infra and accompanying
text.
65. See, e.g., Yale Univ. Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1930)
(where pictorial history of the United States was held copyrightable by the corporate em-
ployer of its compilers).
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arose in Bajpayee, any claimed property interest in the discovery
by the plaintiff would have been presumptively precluded.
A similar result would be reached under the 1976 Act, which
codified the rebuttable presumption in the common law that
works made for hire vest in the employer.66 The 1976 Act permits
alteration of this presumptive right only by written contractual
agreement.67
II. AMERICAN PROPERTY, TORT, AND CONTRACT REMEDIES
FOR APPROPRIATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Scope of Protection of the Common Law
Intellectual property has been subject to two types of protec-
tion: (1) recognition of a contractual or fiduciary obligation be-
tween parties which is breached when access to the property is
exploited, and (2) recognition of property interests under the com-
mon law and statutory copyright and patent laws. 68 The type of
protection afforded by the first approach can be illustrated by an
examination of the law of trade secrets. Though a precise defini-
tion of trade secrets is impossible, in general they "may consist of
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives one an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
66. 17 U.S.C. app. § 201(b) (1976). "Works made for hire" and presumptively as-
signed to the employer must be prepared by the employee within the scope of his employ-
ment. Id. § 101. Evidence used to determine this scope includes: (I) an express contract
for hire, especially an exclusive one; (2) an oral agreement of employment, constituting
more than a mere assignment of individual works; (3) a regularly paid salary; (4) the right
of the employer to direct and supervise the manner of performance; and (5) the creation of
the work at the insistence, time, expense, and with the facilities of the employer. See Angel
& Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 209, 223 (1976).
The right to direct and supervise performance has been considered to be one of the more
determinative factors. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 40, § 5.03[B], at 5-12 & n.18.
The Act also modifies the provisions of the 1909 Act by permitting the assignee of
works created on commission to exercise the privilege of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C.
app. § 101 (1976).
67. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976). Several commentators have interpreted this provision
of the 1976 Act as prohibiting the enforcement of any contract clause which enables the
employer to use or copyright the work on the condition that the employee is designated as
the author or inventor. See, e.g., Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 66, at 217. This inter-
pretation would require that the employee relinquish the right to have his name attributed
to the work once the right to copyright is conceded to the employer.
68. See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 38, at 1166. Other intangible
properties such as mineral rights are protected in a third way. When one exclusively pos-
sesses real property, another's access to the intangible rights connected with that property
give rise to an action in trespass. Id.; Shell Oil Petroleum Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1934).
19791
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it."6 9 Trade secrets, like patents and copyrights, are subject to
protection during the period of the inventor's secrecy against those
who discover them by improper means.7°
Although never protected by statute, trade secrets were pro-
tected at common law. This was particularly so when access to
them was gained through a contractual or employment relation-
ship. Such a relationship raises the inference of access. In Tabor
v. Hoffman,7 for example, the plaintiff's patterns for the produc-
tion of pumps were copied and reproduced by the defendant, a
bailee repairing the pumps. Although the patent on the pumps
had expired, the court held that the plaintiff retained exclusive
rights in the patterns as trade secrets since they had not been pub-
lished.7 a Similarly, in Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout,7 the court en-
joined a former employee of the plaintiff from disclosing a trade
secret for the manufacture of sun dials to his subsequent em-
ployer.74
The interests protected in these trade secret cases are some-
what similar to those for which the plaintiff in Bajayee sought
redress. Tabor and Rideout upheld the creator's right to control
the use of intellectual property prior to publication, while
Bapayee identified a more limited right to be recognized for one's
own work product. The approaches taken, however, are different.
The unauthorized taking and conversion of an inventor's trade
secrets is characterized by Tabor and Rideout as a breach of a
fiduciary relationship between employer and employee. In con-
trast, the parties in Bapayee did not stand in a contractual or em-
ployment relationship but were co-employees. Further, the trade
secret cases granted redress for commercial exploitation of the
plaintiff's creations, 5 while the interest recognized by the
Bajpayee court appears to be of a scientific or noncommercial na-
ture.76
The second approach to protection of intellectual prop-
erty-recognition of property interests under common law and
statutory copyright-has been discussed earlier in this Note.77
69. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b, at 6 (lst ed. 1939).
70. Id. § 759; C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 38, at 1176.
71. 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
72. Id. at 37, 23 N.E. at 13.
73. 29 N.J. Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90 (1954).
74. Id. at 374, 102 A.2d at 97.
75. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Foundry v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887).
76. See text accompanying notes 1-10 supra.
77. See notes 34-67 supra and accompanying text.
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The bounds of its protection, however, are further delineated be-
low in order to illustrate the scope of the common law copyright
actions.
In general, common law copyright protection extended not
only to the actual work but also to a paraphrased or abridged ver-
sion. In Prince Albert v. Strange,7" in which the plaintiffs and
Queen Victoria's sketches were exploited, the court stated that the
"right to prevent 'innocent' writings from being published without
the consent of the proprietor, the author. . . is not lost by partial
and limited communications not made with a view to general pub-
lication. . . . [T]his protection, by the common law. . . cannot
• . .be evaded by a translation. . . by an abridgment, a sum-
mary, or even a review."7 9
State-created causes of action for conversion of intangible
property have allowed recovery primarily for actual injury to a
plaintiff's past earnings. Many courts have extended the protec-
tion to prospective commercial profits where they have been rea-
sonably ascertainable. For example, in an action against Cole
Porter alleging misappropriation of the plaintiff's songs," the
court characterized the right to be protected not as the plaintiff's
ingenuity in music, but as his right to anticipated commercial
profits from its sale."' Thus, in order for the plaintiff in Bapayee
to successfully prove conversion of his intellectual property, he
would have to show either loss of past earnings-an impossible
task since his discovery was as yet unpublished--or loss of pro-
spective profits.
Finally, the role of the media in the common law of copyright
must be noted. In the traditional common law copyright action,
78. 2 De. G. & Sm. 652, 79 Rev. R. 307 (1848).
79. Id. at 692-93, 79 Rev. R. at 325.
80. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). The court in Arnstein imposed
upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the defendant copied the plaintiff's copy-
righted work and, assuming the burden was met, that such copying constituted misappro-
priation. The court found both issues to be factual matters. Under the standard set by this
court, the evidence required to prove copying could have consisted of the defendant's ad-
mission, or may have been circumstantial (when evidence of the defendant's access to the
work could permit the jury to infer that copying had occurred). The claim of misappropri-
ation had to have been substantiated by similarities between the creations, (with expert
testimony admissable for this purpose), although the court required the similarities to be
evaluated by the standard of the reasonable lay person. Striking or obvious similarities
gave rise to an inference that the work had been copied or improperly appropriated. Id. at
468-69.
81. Id. at 473. But see Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 464,
114 P.2d 370 (1941) (permitting tort recovery for the plagiarism of the "concept" of the
creator).
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the media could not reproduce, without consent, any portion of a
creation. 2 The first amendment and the doctrine of "fair use"
later enabled the media to use provocative and noteworthy intel-
lectual property without the creator's authorization. 3 This notion
has been recently limited by the "entire act" doctrine which per-
mits recovery if the entire performance or work, however news-
worthy, has been reproduced by the defendant.8 4
B. Causes of Action Available to Protect Intellectual Property
Rights
Within the broad scope of common law protection of intangi-
ble property interests, several distinct causes of action have
emerged as means by which a plaintiff can seek redress for injury
to his intellectual property. These are (1) unfair competition, 5 (2)
misappropriation,86 (3) defamation,87 (4) breach of contract or
breach of trust,88 (5) right of privacy, 89 and (6) right of publicity.90
In the sections which follow, each of these causes of action is ex-
amined as it has developed at common law to determine its avail-
ability to a plaintiff seeking to protect his work product.
1. Unfair Competition
A civil action for unfair competition arises when the defend-
ant, in competition with the plaintiff, fraudulently attributes his
own work product to the plaintiff to take advantage of the latter's
reputation or skills.9 There are three ways in which this may oc-
cur. First, the defendant may make false representations in order
to "pass off" his goods or services as those of another. Second,
when the defendant's product is similar to the plaintiff's, the plain-
tiff may seek to distinguish his work by virtue of its renowned
characteristics. Third, the defendant may make unauthorized use
82. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 38, at 1191.
83. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
84. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The plaintiff
in Bajpayee relied on language from the state supreme court opinion in Zacchini. 53 Ohio
App. 2d at 121, 372 N.E.2d at 819 (1977). For a discussion of Zacchini, see text accompa-
nying notes 153-59 infra.
85. See notes 91-97 infra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 98-105 infra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 106-128 infra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 129-32 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 133-45 infra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 146-63 infra and accompanying text.
91. Comment, supra note 40, at 318 n.12.
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of the plaintiff's symbol of identification.92
Most courts have required the author or owner of an intellec-
tual property to demonstrate that his name or goodwill has been
injured and that the public has been deceived.93 For example, in
Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., a case in which the defend-
ant was charged with broadcasting degrading sketches based upon
the life of a fictional character taken from the plaintiff's novel, the
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. It
did so to enable the plaintiff to present proof of the appropriation
of her characters, the injury resulting to her reputation as an au-
thor, and the deception inflicted upon the public. If the plaintiff
met this burden of proof, the court felt that equitable relief could
be available by virtue of the doctrine of unfair competition.95
The doctrine of unfair competition would not appear to apply
to a plaintiff in a situation analogous to that of the plaintiff in
Bapayee. Although such a plaintiff could prove that the defend-
ant had deceived the public, the plaintiff would likely fail in his
attempt to show the requisite injury to his name or good will since
the plaintiff's work was not presented by the defendant in a man-
ner degrading to the plaintiff. In addition, an action for unfair
competition assumes that the plaintiff and defendant are in com-
mercially competitive roles. Bajpayee and Rothermich were co-
employees of the foundation, presumably working toward com-
mon goals.
In addition to judicially-created remedies, some states have
passed unfair competition laws modeled after the Uniform Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act.9 6 The Act was designed to prevent com-
mercial advertising deception in transactions involving goods or
services. It protects against the unauthorized appropriation of
goods or services by including practices such as "passing off"
within its definition of unfair trade practices.97 The Act's protec-
tion, however, would probably not extend to the plaintiff in
92. Note, supra note 12, at 581-82.
93. Id.
94. 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939).
95. Id. at 266.
96. For the text of the Act, See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1964).
97. Section 2(a) of the Act provides that a "person engages in a deceptive trade prac-
tice when, in the course of his business, vocation, or occupation he. . .passes off goods or
services as those of another .. " UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(1),
reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 306-13 (1966).
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Bajpayee, since his discovery was scientific and not yet commer-
cially available.
2. Misappropriation
Misappropriation provides redress for commercial exploitation
of another's property interest but does not require proof that the
public has been defrauded, as does an action for unfair competi-
tion.98 Where it is recognized, 99 a cause of action for misappropri-
ation is established upon a showing that the defendant used the
plaintiffs product in competition with the plaintiff. 0
In the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in Goldstein v. Cal-
ifornia-that the Constitution does not vest exclusive power in the
federal government to protect works'0 '-courts have applied the
doctrine in a wide variety of cases.' 0 2 For example, in Mercury
Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc.,10 3 the
court found that the defendant had misappropriated the plaintiffs
taped recordings. The court characterized the wrong to be re-
dressed as
the defendant's use of the plaintiffs product, into which the
plaintiff has put time, skill, and money; and the defendant's use
of the plaintiff's product or a copy of it in competition with the
plaintiff. . . . The wrong is not in the copying, but in the ap-
propriation, of the plaintiff's time, effort and money.'0 4
It appears, however, that application of the doctrine has been lim-
98. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE Doc-
TRINES 92 (1973).
Unfair competition was the forerunner of misappropriation, and the Supreme Court
consolidated the two causes of action into the latter in International News Serv. v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
99. As of 1975, one commentator noted its existence in each of the following jurisdic-
tions: Alaska, California, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. Note, supra note 12, at 585 n.81.
100. Eg., Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163,
175, 218 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1974). The elements which must be proved under this doctrine,
according to one author, are that:
(1) time, effort and money has gone into the creation of the thing misappropri-
ated so that there is some "property right" in the thing taken;
(2) there is appropriation by the defendant at little or no cost; and
(3) unless an injunction is granted there will be a diversion of the plaintiffs
profits to the defendant.
Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 2 U.S.F. L. REv. 292, 295
(1968).
101. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See notes 43-50 supra and accompanying text.
102. E.g., Mercury Record Prods. Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163,
218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 75, 218 N.W.2d at 710.
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ited to parties in direct commercial competition with one another,
when one party enjoys an undue profit by depriving the plaintiff
of his right to market the creation.
10 5
Absent expansion of the doctrine to include noncommercial
relationships, it would be unavailable to claimants such as the
plaintiff in Bajpayee. The defendant in that case did not commer-
cially exploit the plaintiff's work product but instead presented it
to the scientific community to inflate his personal academic repu-
tation. Further, in Bajpayee, as contrasted with actual financial
loss, the plaintiff's injury was limited to putative lost profits and
employment potential. Such speculative damages would have
likely been denied by the court had Bajpayee alleged misappropri-
ation as his basis for relief. It would thus seem that although the
elements of an action for misappropriation are more readily satis-
fied than those of an action for unfair competition, both actions
would be unavailable to those plaintiffs similarly situated to
Bajpayee.
3. Defamation
A successful action in defamation requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate (1) that the defendant has made a false and defama-
tory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the statement was
made to a third party; (3) that the defendant was at least negligent
in making the statement, and (4) that the plaintiff has suffered spe-
cial harm. 0 6 Thus, there is a general overlap between the rights
105. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Veatch v.
Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); Uprora Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F.
Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modfied81 F.2d 373 (Ist Cir. 1935), cert. denied 298 U.S. 670
(1936); Capital Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1969);
Capital Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Mercury Record
Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976). At common law, the tort of def-
amation consisted of two subdivisions: libel, for published falsities, and slander for verbal
assaults. Courts have traditionally balanced the competing interests in the plaintiffs honor
and reputation, the defendant's freedom of speech, and the public's interest in the free flow
of information as well as its social interest in protecting dignity. Wade, The Communicative
Torts and the First Amendment, 48 MIss. L.J. 671, 672 (1977).
Under the common law of defamation, courts have historically imposed liability for
negligent and intentional conduct. Id. They have occasionally imposed strict liability
upon a showing of the publication of a defamatory and false statement about the plaintiff
to a third party. Id. at 673.
Truth was an early common law defense to an action in defamation. Statements made
between spouses and by public officials, trial witnesses, and governmental and legislative
officials were absolutely privileged. Qualified privileges became available when, for exam-
ple, a defendant had endeavored to perfect a third party's or his own interests. Finally, the
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protected in actions for misappropriation and those protected in
defamation actions. Both involve the deception of the public ei-
ther as to the source of the creation, in the case of the former, or as
to its content or nature in the latter.10 7
Indeed, an action in defamation occasionally serves as an al-
ternative ground for recovery in an action for misappropriation.
In Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.,108 the defendant had deliberately
appropriated actor Bert Lahr's unique vocal characterization of a
duck. Lahr, seeking protection of his original style, alleged both
appropriation and defamation.° 9 The court granted relief on the
ground that an imitation of an entertainer in a performance "be-
low his class may be found to damage his reputation. . . ."' 1o In
striving to find this noncommercial injury, the Lahr court inferred
defamatory damage to the plaintiffs professional reputation from
the defendant's derogatory imitation of the plaintiff's style.
Because implied defamation requires proof of established no-
toriety prior to a finding of sufficient injury to reputation to sus-
tain the action, the Bajpayee court could not have availed itself of
the Lahr rationale. A closer look at the law of defamation is nec-
essary, however, to ascertain the extent to which it protects a crea-
tor's work product.
Beginning in 1964 with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"'. and
culminating in 1976 with Time, Inc. v. Firestone,"2 the Supreme
Court forged the constitutional evidentiary standards required in
actions instituted by public officials," 3 public figures," 14 and pri-
vate parties" 15 against publishers of defamatory falsehoods." 16 In
press has had special privileges with regard to its sources of information. Id. These privi-
leges could be forfeited, however, if abused. Id.
Protection against defamation was left primarily to the states by the ninth and tenth
amendments. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1962). State courts have traditionally
distinguished slander per se, in which the plaintiff need not prove special damages but
could rely on presumed damages, from ordinary slander, which required a showing of
injury. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
107. Note, supra note 12, at 586-88.
108. 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962).
109. Id. at 259. The plaintiff alleged unfair competition, defamation, and breach of
privacy. Misappropriation was an element of unfair competition.
110. Id. at 258.
111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
113. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
114. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 1349 (1975).
115. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
116. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). These standards have also been held
applicable to right of privacy actions. See notes 133-45 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 29:735
PLGIA RISM
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," 7 the Court held that the states could
define for themselves the standard of care that publishers and
broadcasters must satisfy when making statements concerning
nonpublic individuals, as long as the "liability without fault" stan-
dard was not applied. 18 The case also reaffirmed the Court's
holding in New York Times that suits instituted by public figures
or officials require proof that the defendant had knowledge of the
falsity of the statement or made it with reckless disregard as to its
validity." 9
Like Bajpayee, the Gertz case involved a private plaintiff. The
Gertz plaintiff was an attorney who was injured by false and de-
famatory statements published in American Opinion, a John Birch
Society publication owned by the defendant. The Supreme Court
had previously implied that the availability of a special privilege
for reporting was dependent not upon whether the plaintiff was a
private or public figure, but upon whether the publicized event
was a matter of general or public interest.' 20 The Court repudi-
ated this position in Gertz, however, and established separate lia-
bility standards for private plaintiffs.' 2 1 Thus, by implication, the
qualified privilege for publicizing matters of public interest was no
longer available to defendants in cases such as Bajpayee.'22 In-
stead, such cases now require a state-determined liability standard
of at least negligence.' 23
The Gertz court also eliminated the distinction between slan-
der and slander per se for private plaintiffs by permitting recovery
only for actual and proven harm, 24 the ultimate compelling state
interest being compensation. Accordingly, the plaintiff must
demonstrate actual damage to his reputation, although he need
not necessarily assign to it a precise monetary value.' 25 This stan-
117. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
118. Id. at 347.
119. Id. at 334.
120. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
121. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
122. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979) the Supreme Court declined to
elevate the plaintiff, a behavioral scientist, to public figure status for defamation purposes
despite previous media exposure of the fact that his work was federally funded. Such a
holding suggests that Bajpayee, a biochemist, also would not be a public figure in a defa-
mation action.
123. It should be noted that Bajpayee alleged actual malice. 53 Ohio App. 2d at 118,
372 N.E.2d at 818.
124. 418 U.S. at 348-50.
125. Id. at 350.
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dard of proof may establish a large obstacle for private plaintiffs,
such as Bajpayee.
The Court in Gertz refrained from expressing an opinion re-
garding the applicability of its holding to defendants beyond the
communications media, the press, or the publishing industry. In
practice, the Court has used the same standards where the defend-
ant was arguably not within the "communications media" classifi-
cation.126 Indeed, the defendant's publication in Gertz might be
considered semi-private with a circulation limited to the John
Birch Society's membership. Further application of similar stan-
dards to non-media defendants can be found in New York
Times, 127 where the co-defendants were private individuals who
had submitted the allegedly false advertisement to the newspaper.
Consequently, the privileges and standards prescribed in Gertz
may be imposed on non-media defendants and in other tort ac-
tions, thus covering cases similar to Bajpayee. Their application
in Lahr,128 an action by a public figure against a non-media ad-
vertising manufacturer, would render an identical result. The de-
fendant's conduct with knowledge or reckless disregard for the
consequences of his action would justify the court's award of pre-
sumed or general damages to a public figure plaintiff. Conversely,
a private plaintiff would be required to prove actual damages to
his reputation, precluding such a finding of implied defamatory
conduct. This rationale could prove fatal to a court's sua sponte
creation of a right of recognition for one's work product for the
private plaintiff who could not prove actual and present damages
to his reputation, absent a finding of actual malice.
4. Breach of Contract or Breach of Trust
Traditionally, a plaintiff must stand in a special relationship
with the defendant to recover for a breach of contract or trust. In
an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff and the defendant
must be parties to the contract, while an action for breach of trust
is based on the breach of a confidential relationship such as that
created between employer and employee.' 29 The underlying basis
126. The Supreme Court has, however, expressly declined to decide whether the New
York Times standard applies to an individual defendant as well as to media defendants.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 n.16 (1979).
127. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
129.- Comment, Copyright and Privacy Protection ofUnpublished Works - The Author's
Dilemma, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 351, 391 n.202 (1977). The shop work doctrine
substantially limits a plaintiffs recovery for breach of contract or breach of trust by as-
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of each relationship is the mutual expectation of the parties as to
performance and loyalty. When intellectual property is at issue, a
breach occurs when an idea shared in either express or implied
confidence is later used without the creator's consent. 130 For ex-
ample, in cases involving trade secrets, courts have protected orig-
inal inventions and ideas by finding that a confidential
relationship existed between the parties.' 31
Because the plaintiff in Bajpayee conceded that he had no
common law copyright interest in his discovery by virtue of the
shop work doctrine, he was precluded from alleging either a
breach of contract or of trust. Under such circumstances, both of
these would have been viable actions if brought by his employer,
the Columbus Medical Center Foundation. Alternatively,
Bajpayee might have instituted suit against the Foundation for
breach of an implied contract to publish the discovery under its
own name, as the proprietor. Although such an action would be
directed at the wrong tortfeasor, the defendant could possibly
have been impleaded. Nevertheless, Bajpayee would have been
precluded from an independent action for breach of trust against
the defendant absent a showing of a confidential relationship be-
tween them.' 32
Courts have typically employed breach of contract or trust
doctrines when the defendant has, or would have been, unjustly
enriched financially. From this standpoint, it is unlikely that a
court would grant recovery to a plaintiff such as Bajpayee, since
the defendant has not benefitted financially from his appropria-
tion of the discovery. Although the defendant in Bapayee may
signing to an employer the fruits of an employee's creations made within the scope of his
employment. See notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text. Section 201(b) of the 1976
Act codified the common law presumption that property interests in an employee's work,
produced during the course of employment, vest in his employer for copyright purposes.
17 U.S.C. app. § 201(b) (1976). Thus, it would appear that an employee can retain control
over his work only by proof that the work was outside the scope of his employment under
§ 101, that contractual terms existed to that effect, or that the work was not sufficiently
advanced to be considered a final version and was therefore not publishable for copyright
purposes. Although this latter basis might provide a means by which to allege a breach of
contract or breach of trust against the employer, recovery would probably be limited be-
cause of the eventual transfer of the copyright interest to the employer and would most
likely be minimal, absent evidence of material differences between the contents of the actu-
ally-exploited and expected end products.
130. Comment, supra note 129, at 391 & n.202. See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 535, 547, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44 (1966).
131. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Foundry v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887).
See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
132. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
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have benefitted professionally and hence commercially from
Bajpayee's discovery, measurement of his unjust enrichment is
merely speculative and would be inadequate in ascertaining
Bajpayee's recoverable damages.
5. Right of Privacy
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis promoted a new cause of action
called the right to privacy. In their article of the same name,
33
they quoted extensively from Prince Albert v. Strange3 4 and anal-
ogized to the common law of copyright. They observed: "The
principle which protects personal writings and all other personal
productions. . . against publication in any form, is in reality not
the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personal-
ity."135
The right to privacy is now recognized by statute or common
law in nearly every state.' 36 It protects the commercial interest in
an individual's popularity by forbidding the unauthorized use of
his name, portrait, or picture for advertising or trade purposes.
Where the right is statutory, the courts have examined the user's
motives to determine whether the use was for trade or advertising
purposes. Common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, have
stressed the context of the use, granting relief for commercial ex-
ploitation of a name or picture. 31
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,138 a right of privacy action arose from
Life magazine's article about a play whose script was derived
from the experiences of the plaintiffs family.139 Although the
plaintiff was a private individual, the Supreme Court held that the
defendant's misstatements were privileged unless they were made
with knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth. 4 ° The Court
concluded that the subject of the Lffe article was newsworthy, and
thus warranted the protection of the first amendment.' 4 ' By ap-
plying the New York Times standard, the Court raised the private
plaintiff's burden of proof in privacy actions to actual malice
133. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
134. 2 De. G. & Sm. 652, 79 Rev. R. 307 (1848). See text accompanying notes 78-79
.supra.
135. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 133, at 205.
136. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
137. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 38, at 1130 n.32.
138. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
139. Id. at 378.
140. Id. at 387-88.
141. Id. at 388.
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when the object of the defendant's appropriation is of public inter-
est. In the context of Bajpayee, if a court found that a scientific
discovery was newsworthy, a plaintiff would have to meet a simi-
lar burden of proof.'42
Gertz indicates, however, that the states are free to impose
lesser standards of liability for private plaintiffs in privacy actions,
provided that at least a standard of negligence is imposed.
143
Thus, the extent of protection afforded a plaintiff in Bajpayee's
situation depends on whether a court applies Hill or Gertz.144 As
for the burden of proof regarding damages, Gertz states that ac-
tual injury, though not necessarily limited to monetary loss, must
be demonstrated. 145 The Gertz Court seemed to establish the de-
fense of truth for both public figures and private plaintiffs. Later
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,'4 6 the Supreme Court denied
its treatment of the issue in Gertz and expressly declined to deter-
mine whether the defense was available to private plaintiffs.
1 47
Hence, the issue has seemingly been reserved to the states.
6. The Right of Publicity
Dean Prosser subdivided the right of privacy into four distinct
142. Although Bajpayee involved a non-media defendant, the only court that has held
that such a defendant was not entitled to first amendment protection did so because the
facts before it did not concern a matter of public interest. Caleso v. Del Chem. Corp., 68
Wis. 2d 487, 506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1975) discussed in Collins & Drushal, The Reaction
ofthe State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 306, 332
(1978). See note 122 supra. Moreover, others have argued more persuasively that it would
be anomalous if courts held non-media defendants to a higher standard of care than media
defendants, since (1) the first amendment does not distinguish between "speech" and
"press," (2) a private person's misstatement is less likely to harm an individual than a
defamatory media publication, (3) the media are the better risk spreaders, and (4) the me-
dia are more likely to be knowledgeable of the law. See, e.g. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,
276 Md. 580, 592-93, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976) (quoting The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARv. L. Rav. 41, 148 n.52 (1974)); Collins & Drushal, supra at 333, 334.
143. 418 U.S. at 347.
144. Gertz was decided subsequent to Hill and established a new mode of analy-
sis-which centers upon the status of the plaintiff rather than the subject matter of the
misstatement. For a discussion of how plaintiff's status as a public or private figure deter-
mines the standard of liability, see note 142 supra. Yet, Hill has not been explicitly over-
ruled. In fact, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the
Court may impliedly have approved of the continued use of Hill for privacy actions. While
the Court criticized the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance on Hill in a right of publicity ac-
tion, it did not state that Hill's approach to privacy cases had been outmoded. Id. at
570-72. See text accompanying notes 149-51 infra.
145. 418 U.S. at 350.
146. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
147. Id. at 491.
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torts. 4 8 The right of publicity is the offspring of his fourth classi-
fication and is directed at the appropriation of the plaintiffs name
or likeness as used in his professional capacity. It permits an indi-
vidual to exploit his name and reputation to his best advantage
and precludes their commercial usage by others. The right of
publicity contemplates that the plaintiff's notoriety has been previ-
ously established and that his name or likeness has inherent com-
mercial value.
This right was first articulated in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps
Chewing Gum Co. 149 In Topps, the court found that unlike the
right to privacy, which is nonassignable, the right to use a name,
and by inference a picture or photograph, could be granted to an
exclusive licensee.' 5 ° The court thus extended common law pro-
tection to an individual's right to assign his name if it had com-
mercial or pecuniary value. It did not decide whether the new
right protected only commercially valuable products, or whether a
product could also be protected for its educational or intellectual
value. One commentator speculated that the court intended to
protect not only the actual value of a product but also the putative
commercial value of an unknown creator's work. 5 '
It has been suggested that this action provides redress when a
work is falsely attributed to an author, deceiving the public and
thereby damaging him. Similarly, it has been suggested that re-
covery is possible when an uncompleted work is published with-
out the author's approval under circumstances which suggest that
it is his final work product.'52 In either of these situations, how-
ever, the defendant must have benefitted from the publication and
is liable to the plaintiff for his unjust enrichment in the event that
the plaintiff is not a public figure. 153
In Bajpayee, the defendant appropriated the prospective aca-
demic and commercial value of the plaintiff's name by claiming
the work product as his own. In so doing, the defendant's action
infringed upon the plaintiff's right of publicity. However, the fact
that the defendant used the plaintiff's property for noncommercial
148. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
149. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
150. Id. at 868.
151. Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1130
(1953).
152. Comment, supra note 129, at n.235.
153. Gordon, Right ofProperty in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. L.
REV. 553, 611 (1960).
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purposes may preclude the plaintiff from recovering under this
cause of action.
In Zacchini v. Scriops-Howard Broadcasting Co.,"' a per-
former brought action to recover damages for the unauthorized
broadcast of his entire act, which consisted of his being shot from
a cannon. The Supreme Court of Ohio refrained the plaintiff's
cause of action as one based not on his right of privacy, as alleged,
but on his right of publicity. Nevertheless, the court denied recov-
ery on the ground that the defendant's report was privileged be-
cause it concerned a matter of public interest.'55
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that
the media could not appropriate the "entire act" of the plaintiff
because it confficted with the state's interest in protecting the pro-
prietary interest of a performer.'56 It held that the media was not
protected by the first amendment when it broadcasted an entire
act without the performer's consent.157 The Court reasoned that
such an unauthorized appropriation of the plaintiff's performance
would threaten its economic value'58 and characterized the state's
interest in protecting that performance as "analogous to the goals
of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individ-
ual to reap the reward of his endeavors. . . ,,159 The Court also
noted several rationales underlying the "entire act" doctrine: the
unjust enrichment of the defendant, the destruction of a per-
former's ability to earn a living, and the interest of the community
in entertainment. 60 It suggested that damages be measured by
the plaintiff's measurable losses.' 6
1
In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,62 the widows of Laurel
and Hardy successfully brought action against a former assignee
of the actors' names and likenesses. The court found that the right
of publicity, which protected from appropriation or commercial
exploitation some element of the actors' personalities, could be as-
signed for a limited duration, after which it was inheritable, espe-
cially when the actors had created their own characters. 63 The
154. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976).
155. Id. at 235-36, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
156. 433 U.S. at 579.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 575.
159. Id. at 573.
160. Id. at 576.
161. Id.
162. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
163. Id.
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court noted that the right "usually becomes important only when
the plaintiff. . . has achieved in some degree a celebrated sta-
tus." '164 The failure of the actors or their heirs to carry statutory
copyright notices, the court said, was not an implied grant to the
public of the right to commercial exploitation of the actors' names
and likenesses. 65
It would seem from the foregoing analysis and cases that the
right of publicity would not protect the plaintiff whose creative
genius is not yet publicly acknowledged. While this right does
guard against the defendant's appropriation of the plaintiff's idea
for his own benefit, it is limited to plaintiffs who have established
reputations and to situations in which the defendant has been un-
justly enriched commercially. As such, this cause of action would
appear to be unavailable to claimants such as Bajpayee.
III. THE MORAL RIGHT DOCTRINE
This section of the Note contrasts the breadth and limitations
of the American causes of action presented above with the Euro-
pean moral right doctrine. The Note then analyzes the moral
right doctrine and examines efforts by our courts to implement
protections similar to those afforded by the doctrine.
A. Europe
Although the doctrine of drolt moral tends to be associated
with the French, it has also been adopted in the Pan American
Literary and Artistic Property Convention as well as the Brussels
Protocol of the Berne Union.' 6 The United States is not eligible
to become a member of the Berne Convention until it complies
with the Convention's minimum standards for copyright law. One
objection to admitting the United States has been our short term
for renewal of copyright protection. This objection may have
been remedied by the longer term of renewal permitted by the
1976 Act.1 6
7
164. Id. at 847.
165. Id.
166. THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, art. 6 bis, reprinted in H. HOWELL, HOWELI'S COPYRIGHT LAW 310 (4th rev. ed.
1962).
167. For example, the copyright renewal term for a proprietor was increased by the
1976 Act from 28 to 47 years for works enjoying an initial term of copyright on the effective
date of the new Act. 17 U.S.C. App. § 304(a) (1976). For a discussion of the proprietor's
right to its employee's work product, see note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention provides an author with
the following rights:
Independently of the patrimonial rights of the author, and even
after the assignment of the said rights, the author retains the
right to claim the paternity of the work, as well as the right to
object to every deformation, mutilation or other modification
of the said work, which may be prejudicial to his honor or to
his reputation.1
68
These rights are governed by the legislatures of the member na-
tions.1 69 They include four distinct area of protectible interests:
the right of creation and publication of one's work; the right of
paternity, which provides one with the right to be recognized for
one's work; the right of integrity, which protects one against dis-
tortions of one's work product; and the right to withdraw or disa-
vow a creation.17 0
B. The American Response
The American courts have recognized the need to protect the
interests sanctioned by the moral right doctrine but have limited
their ability to do so by restricting recovery to actions in contract,
property, and tort. 17  For example, in Chaplin v. Amador,t72 the
court used the doctrine of unfair competition to protect the enter-
tainer's right of paternity, and in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 17
3
the court implied defamation to protect the performer's right of
integrity. As a result, the plaintiff may be confused as to the ap-
propriate cause of action to allege. In Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Corp.,'7" for example, although the plaintiff asserted that
the defendant had violated his property rights by appropriating
his motion picture scenerio, the court stated that the cause of ac-
tion sounded in tort for plagiarism.
Early American cases tended to deny recovery to a plaintiff for
his right to be recognized for his work. In Vargas v. Esquire,175
168. Berne Convention, art. 6 bis (Rome, 1928).
169. Roeder, The Doctrine ofAoral Right: A Study in the Law ofArtists, Authors, and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554, 556-57 (1940).
170. Streibich, Part II, supra note 34, at 74.
171. Id.
172. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928). The entertainer's right of paternity sometimes
is effectively protected on the ground that the defendant was "passing oft' his character as
that of the performer. In Chaplin, for example, injunctive relief was held appropriate
against the defendant's use of the name "Charlie Aplin" in his performance.
173. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962). See text accompanying notes 108-110 supra.
174. 45 Cal. App. 2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 (1941). See also note 12 supra.
175. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
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the court held that the plaintiff, who had contracted with a pub-
lisher to allow the latter the use of his portraits, had forever relin-
quished the right to be recognized for his work. The court also
struck down the plaintiff's claim that his rights were protectible
under the doctrine of moral right, or alternatively, under misap-
propriation or misrepresentation theories.1 76 Vargas is perhaps
typical of the early American reluctance to expand the scope of
protection to rights included in the moral right doctrine, although
here the plaintiffs claim may not have merited such an extension.
In a later case, Granz v. Harris,177 the court sought to protect
the plaintiff's "rights of integrity and paternity" through existing
American causes of action. The plaintiff was a jazz musician who
had produced recordings of two of his songs on twelve-inch 78
r.p.m. masters, which he sold to the defendant under a contract
requiring the defendant's use of the plaintiff's credit line. In man-
ufacturing ten-inch 78 r.p.m. records, the defendant deleted eight
minutes of the original recording.
The plaintiff failed to prove actual damages; however, the
court found injunctive relief appropriate to prevent further irrepa-
rable harm to the "plaintiff's reputation as an expert in the pres-
entation of jazz concerts,"' 178 provided that the plaintiff had not
waived his right by requiring the defendant to use his credit line.
The case was remanded for a determination of this issue.
The court declined to reject the doctrine of moral right, and
the concurring opinion of Judge Frank stated: "I agree . . . that
whether by way of contract or tort, plaintiff. . . is entitled to pre-
vention of the publication, as his, of a garbled version of his un-
copyrighted product."' 79 He stated that American courts have
enjoined the use of a reputable author's characteristics to prevent
buyers from erroneously believing they were purchasing a work
by the author. He continued:
Whether ... copyrighted or not, the established rule is that,
even if the contract ... expressly authorizes reasonable modi-
fications. . . it is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as
author of a version which substantially departs from the origi-
nal. . . . The irreparable harm [here] . . . becomes apparent
when one thinks what would be the result if the selected
speeches of Stalin were published under the name of Senator
Robert Taft, or the poems of Ella Wheeler Wilcox as those of
176. Id. at 526.
177. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
178. Id. at 588.




Although the court in Granz did not reject the moral right doc-
trine, neither did the court adopt it-it essentially circumvented
the issue by employing alternative grounds for redress.
The right of integrity which protects a creator against the mu-
tilation of his work product has yet to be protected by contract in
the United States. One commentator has stated:
In the United States, the publisher or producer who purchases a
copyright has no duty to preserve the integrity of the work.
Only if the author successfully [sic] bargained for the right to
be acknowledged as the creator of his work or for the right to
give final approval to the finished script can he protect his work
by recourse to actions for defamation, privacy, or breach of
contract. 
8 1
Under the moral right doctrine, however, the publisher of a work
impliedly promises to reproduce the work faithfully.1
82
The right to be recognized for one's work or characterization
has finally been distinguished in the American courts from the
property right in the work itself. Such rights are considered per-
sonal rights which survive the creator. They can be contractually
assigned but only for the term of the contract and are even then
revocable.'83 The ability to assert the right has been traditionally
foreclosed to a plaintiff who has assigned the use of the property
to another.
This is the point at which the Bajpayee court departed from
the current common law.'84 It permitted the plaintiff to be recog-
nized as the author of the discovery, despite the fact that all rights
to ownership in the property had vested in the employer. The
court's holding is unique among American decisions in its ac-
knowledgment that the plaintiff's right of recognition was actiona-
ble independently from his common law copyright interest in the
unpublished work.
Section 43(a) of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)' 85
180. Id.
181. Comment, TowardArtistic Integrity. Implementing Moral Right Through Extension
ofExistingAmerican LegalDoctrine, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539, 1541 (1972) citedin Streibich, Part
II, supra note 34, at 80.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 79 (citing Prince v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)). See notes 162-65 supra and accompanying text.
184. This is further indicated by the court's inability to substantiate its holding with
precedents.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1976).
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has sometimes been used to protect the public's right to the truth
regarding goods or services. This section provides:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods or
services. . . a false designation of origin, or any false descrip-
tion or representation, including words or other symbols tend-
ing falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause
such goods or services to enter into commerce. . . shall be lia-
ble to. . . any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representa-
tion. 1186
In order to avoid the application of the moral right doctrine,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has used contract law, copy-
right law, and the Lanham Act to protect an author against exces-
sive editing of his work. In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Co. ,87 (The Monty Python case), the plaintiff's contract with the
defendant for the production of three television programs con-
tained a clause requiring that editorial changes would be subject
to plaintiff's approval. Excessive editorial changes without his ap-
proval were held by the court to infringe his common law copy-
right in the original script, and the mutilation of the script
constituted a misrepresentation in violation of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 88 In so holding, the court combined the statutory
right against unfair competition in the Lanham Act, which is lim-
ited to goods and services in interstate commerce, with the com-
mon law tort rights against the mutilation of one's artistic integrity
to protect the author's moral right in his literary creation.
As contrasted with the American use of traditional contract,
tort, property, and statutory rights for recovery, the French infer
from the moral right doctrine the duty of the assignee to
reproduce the creation in an accurate manner. Granz followed
this rationale, in different terms, by imposing upon the assignee a
duty not to falsely represent the plaintiff's work product, based
upon the contract's stipulation that the assignee would use the
plaintiff's work with his credit line in the manufacture of record-
ings. However, both Granz and Monty Python are unusual in the
history of American judicial protection for these natural rights,
and require the courts to strain with currently available alterna-
tives in order to circumvent the invocation of the Continental doc-
trine of moral right. Moreover, the protection afforded in the
186. Id.
187. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
188. The court partially relied on Granz in reaching its result. Id. at 17.
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United States is often inadequate for the coverage of all of the
rights encompassed by the European doctrine.
A portion of the moral right doctrine was clearly designed to
preserve rights of a creator equivalent to those abridged by the
defendant in Bajpayee. The natural rights of Bajpayee to disclose
his work to the public through his employer and to retain the right
of recognition for his discovery would be grounds for recovery
under the doctrine of moral right. These rights prevail regardless
of the author's assignment or relinquishment of the copyright in
his work and foreclose a third party from crediting the work to
anyone other than the true author. Bajpayee's cause of action fits
well within the scope of the established European law of moral
rights. Being of paramount importance to writers, inventors,
scientists, scholars, and other creators, and long recognized under
the moral right doctrine, these rights should be equally protected
within the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ohio appellate court found that the plaintiff in Bajpqayee
was entitled to recognition for the authorship of his discovery, and
that the right of recognition existed separately from any rights to
ownership under common law or statutory copyright law. 89 In its
attempt to reach an equitable result, the court issued a somewhat
confused and unsubstantiated decision, leaving unclear whether
the right of recognition should be labelled a prima facie tort, pla-
giarism per se, or the right to privacy.' 90 Although the court failed
to take notice of the moral right doctrine, the plaintiff's interests
for which the court mandated protection clearly rested within the
scope of the doctrine.
The courts in the United States have devised new actions, and
subdivisions thereof, to ensure redress for the commercial ex-
ploitation of a creator's work product. Most of these have com-
pensated the plaintiff for actual injuries, consisting of lost profits,
occasionally for the defendant's unjust enrichment. Actions pro-
tecting interests similar to those alleged by Bajpayee include un-
fair competition, misappropriation, conversion, breach of
contract, and the rights of privacy and publicity, conversion of in-
tangible property rights, and intentional interference with his con-
189. 53 Ohio App. 2d at 120, 372 N.E.2d at 820.
190. Id. at 122, 372 N.E.2d at 822.
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tract rights.' 9 ' The causes of action for unfair competition and
misappropriation were precluded since the plaintiff and defendant
were not in competition with one another. An action for breach of
contract was unavailable due to the lack of a contractual relation-
ship between the parties. The right of privacy was disallowed be-
cause the defendant did not use the plaintiff's name, portrait, or
picture for trade or advertising purposes and because a matter of
probable public interest was disclosed. The right of publicity
would probably have been an incorrect characterization of the
plaintiff's action since the plaintiff was not well known and the
defendant had not been unjustly enriched. The latter two causes
of action also assume the defendant's commercial exploitation of
the creation, thereby barring their use in Bajpayee.192
An action for breach of trust, arising from the employment re-
lationship, would be the most likely basis for Bajpayee's recovery,
although it is limited by the shop work doctrine and by the parties'
status as co-employees. Recovery based on the defendant's breach
of an implied contract to reproduce or present the plaintiff's work
only as that of his employer, the Columbus Medical Center Foun-
dation, might have been possible had the foundation been sued as
a co-defendant, with Rothermich involved in his official capacity
as president and medical director. Alternatively, had the court
analogized the cause of action to defamation, the plaintiff would
have been required to prove actual injury to his reputation or that
his work was presented in an inferior context. Yet, all of these
causes of action contain sufficient limitations to thwart their invo-
cation by the Bajpayee court.
The tort of plagiarism per se or the right of recognition, as
acknowledged by the Bajpayee court, seeks to remedy the gaps in
the previously developed American doctrines by allowing recov-
ery for the direct injury to Bajpayee from the deprivation of his
right to be recognized. The court offered further compensation for
the indirect injuries to the plaintiff resulting from the defamatory
implications of and inherent employment value lost by the de-
fendant's conduct. Because none of the actions justifying punitive
damages were directly applicable to Bajpayee, the court recog-
nized plagiarism as a prima facie tort.
Regardless of the action's designation, the court in Bajpayee
191. Id. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 818. The last two of these grounds were alleged by
Bajpayee.
192. See notes 133-63 supra and accompanying text.
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clearly envisioned that the district court, on remand, would com-
pensate the plaintiff for the loss of his moral right to be recognized
for his creation, despite the eventual assignment of his copyright
interest to his employer. At present, one can only speculate
whether plagiarism per se will be accepted by the courts; neverthe-
less, the Bajayee decision represents a first step in furtherance of
American protection of moral rights.
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